Difference between revisions of "Safety culture"
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After the Chernobyl accident INSAG named Safety culture among the fundamental management principles along with the responsibilities of the operating organizations and the provision of regulatory control and verification of safety related activities. There, the term ‘safety culture’ refers to the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engages in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plant. Furthermore, the IAEA has developed five safety principles and 37 attributes of safety culture (IAEA, Safety Guide No. CS-G-3.5, 2009). The concept was introduced to explain how the lack of knowledge and understanding of risks and safety by employees and the whole organization contributed to the inappropriate attitude and consequently to the disaster of Chernobyl. | After the Chernobyl accident INSAG named Safety culture among the fundamental management principles along with the responsibilities of the operating organizations and the provision of regulatory control and verification of safety related activities. There, the term ‘safety culture’ refers to the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engages in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plant. Furthermore, the IAEA has developed five safety principles and 37 attributes of safety culture (IAEA, Safety Guide No. CS-G-3.5, 2009). The concept was introduced to explain how the lack of knowledge and understanding of risks and safety by employees and the whole organization contributed to the inappropriate attitude and consequently to the disaster of Chernobyl. | ||
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The IAEA defined the concept of a safety culture as “the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”. | The IAEA defined the concept of a safety culture as “the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”. | ||
The definition recognized that a safety culture is both structural and attitudinal in nature and relates to the organisation and its style, as well as to attitudes, approaches and the commitment of individuals at all levels in the organisation. | The definition recognized that a safety culture is both structural and attitudinal in nature and relates to the organisation and its style, as well as to attitudes, approaches and the commitment of individuals at all levels in the organisation. | ||
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==Related articles== | ==Related articles== | ||
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[[Category:Organizational culture]] | [[Category:Organizational culture]] |
Latest revision as of 16:23, 21 December 2015
Definition
The assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.
Description
After the Chernobyl accident INSAG named Safety culture among the fundamental management principles along with the responsibilities of the operating organizations and the provision of regulatory control and verification of safety related activities. There, the term ‘safety culture’ refers to the personal dedication and accountability of all individuals engages in any activity which has a bearing on the safety of nuclear power plant. Furthermore, the IAEA has developed five safety principles and 37 attributes of safety culture (IAEA, Safety Guide No. CS-G-3.5, 2009). The concept was introduced to explain how the lack of knowledge and understanding of risks and safety by employees and the whole organization contributed to the inappropriate attitude and consequently to the disaster of Chernobyl.
The IAEA defined the concept of a safety culture as “the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”. The definition recognized that a safety culture is both structural and attitudinal in nature and relates to the organisation and its style, as well as to attitudes, approaches and the commitment of individuals at all levels in the organisation.
The universal features of a safety culture can be categorized at three levels: policy, management and individuals. For example, the management level covers the definition of responsibility, the definition and control of safety practices, qualification and training, rewards and sanctions, audit, and review and comparison. The individual level deals with a questioning attitude, a rigorous and prudent approach and communication.
Approach how safety culture can be continuously improved shown on a Fig 1.
Knowledge management and Safety culture have proven to be sensitive issues for nuclear operating organizations because of their cross-cutting character, involving both operational, management and cultural issues, which can be strongly influenced by national, organizational or corporate (industry) culture in a given country.
References
[1] IAEA Safety Guide GS-G-3.5 “The management system for nuclear installations” (2009);
[2] IAEA Safety Glossary 2007 Edition;